institutions can shape which ethnic identity is activated in mobilizing voters.
ii This paper goes considerably further than that, presenting evidence that suggests that in rural Africa, property institutions go far in determining whether ethnic identity has political salience at all.
The analysis focuses on rural property regimes in land. These are institutional configurations that vary across countries as well as across subnational regions within countries, and that are actively molded and enforced by African states. In most of Africa, rural property regimes are "neocustomary" in nature. The "customary" refers to the ethnic entitlements to land that these property regimes embody and convey, as well as to the place they grant to "customary" leaders in land rights adjudication and enforcement.
"Neo" underscores the extent to which pre-colonial land tenure practices and authority structures were remolded under colonial indirect rule, and then modified by postcolonial governments in ways that reproduced their neocustomary character. About 80-90% of all farmland in most African countries is held under some type of neocustomary tenure.
Most governments recognize neocustomary land rights and administer neocustomary tenure regimes at least partly through the intermediation of neocustomary leaders such as chiefs. Landholdings held under this form of tenure are not surveyed, registered, or titled.
iii Large literatures in history and economic anthropology have argued that neocustomary land tenure regimes in Africa create economically-and politically-salient ethnic identities, and uphold local political intermediaries such as chiefs as community representatives in the eyes of the state. iv From a broadly comparative perspective, this argument should not be surprising: property institutions that allocate access to natural resources on the basis of membership in ethnic communities have been shown to produce identity-activating or identity-enhancing effects in other parts of the world, including on Native American (Indian) reservations in the United States and in "indigenous territories"
in Latin American countries. v More generally, government institutions and policies that allocate goods on the basis of ascriptive identities often play a strong role in creating, shaping, and valorizing such identities, and in catalyzing the formation of social groups defined in terms of these indentities. The analysis provides support for the argument that Tanzania's distinctly statist land tenure institutions produce two distinct political effects. First, they devalue ethnicity as a political and economic identity because the institutional rules provide no incentives for overt political discourse that justifies claims to agricultural land in ethnic terms.
Second, the statist land institutions give rural citizens direct channels of access to national judicial and electoral institutions. Neotraditional authorities are not imposed as intermediaries between rural citizens and the state. The conclusion draws out implications for institutional analysis in Africa, for explaining national identity in Tanzania, and for studies of ethnicity.
I. Different types of land institutions and their political effects
There is a large literature on land tenure institutions in rural Africa, most of it focusing on the origins and effects of the so-called neocustomary land regimes. These were institutionalized as the foundation of colonial indirect rule and were upheld by postcolonial states (in modified forms) in much, perhaps most, of independent Africa. 
II. Development of a Statist Land Tenure Regime in Tanzania
Tanzania stands out as a rare example of a statist land tenure regime that has been imposed and implemented throughout the national space. Today's land institutions developed over time in seven key phases, or steps.
The first phase was the period of colonial indirect rule in Tanganika 
III. Six Manyara Cases: Statist Land Institutions and Their Political Effects
Our research in the western districts of Manyara Region, Tanzania, provides empirical support for this argument about the political effects of non-neocustomary (ie., statist) land tenure institutions. Research design principles guided this regional focus and case selection therein. The western part of Manyara is a region of relatively high population density, historically good rainfall levels, good soil fertility, and high levels of commercialization of agriculture, mostly on family farms. There are high levels of inmigration and widespread perceptions of land scarcity. The social and economic pressures that find expression in "sons of the soil" ethnic conflicts in other parts of Africa are present. However, because of institutional factors (ie., presence of de-ethnicized land tenure institutions), we expect this form of conflict to be absent. And in a region where land-related tensions run high, there are many opportunities to observe the scale at which land dispute adjudication plays out. We expect some land cases to scale up through the national judicial and electoral system (to be "exported" out of local arena). This is because Tanzanian land institutions do not empower neotraditional intermediaries to "bottle up conflict" at the local level. Figure 1 locates the six cases on a map of Manyara Region's western districts. Small farmers, workers, and the landless have attacked the investors and vandalized their properties, burning sugar plantations and killing farm owners and managers in the early 1990s, mid-1990s, and in 2011. Through violence, protests, civil disobedience, and the multiparty system, they continue to demand that the government terminate the commercial leases and allocate land to them. The state backs the investors but has not responded forcefully to repress violence and threats against the investors, or to prevent encroachment on the plantations.
In the absence of institutions for the creation or affirmation of neocustomary (ethnic) rights, land-related conflict in this setting is not expressed as ethnic conflict.
Rather, it has taken the form of politicized land-related violence pitting "indigenous Tanzanians" against "outside investors" (who are non-indigenous Tanzanian citizens).
The conflict scaled up through national-level electoral and judicial institutions. This is a region that is fully multi-cultural and in which ethnicity is not recognized as the basis of making claims to land.
iii. Riroda and Ayasanda, the ex-Gorowa Native Authority area Within Babati District, two rural wards are considered "Gorowa native areas" and represent part of the core of the now defunct Gorowa Native Authority: Ayasanda and
Riroada. This was a territory with a titular ethnic group with communal claims to territory, and that was represented by a state-recognized chief under colonial rule. If there is anywhere in Babati where agriculturalists can claim to have ancestral claims to territory, it is here. What we observed at the village and ward level was observed by the Nairobi- A second finding is that in all cases, land conflicts "scale up" to institutions and arenas that are distinctly part of the formal state apparatus and the national polity. V. Non-conforming situations? Under neocustomary institutions, the high economic and political salience of ethnic identities is an institutional effect.
A by-product of this study is a new answer to an enduring "puzzle" in studies of
African politics: the low salience of ethnicity in Tanzania, compared to ethnicity's high salience in Tanzania's neighbors --Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zambia. The low salience of political ethnicity in Tanzania is picked up in Afrobarometer survey data, and is stressed in diverse literatures focusing on both the national and local levels.
lxi Scholarly discussion has been over how to account for the Tanzania anomaly, rather than whether it exists. Existing work has pointed to a range of non-institutional causes: low population density and high ethnic fragmentation, use of Swahili as a unifying national language, socialist ideologies and strong civic-education policies, the unifying force of President Julius Nyerere (1963 Nyerere ( -1990 , and the existence of an "inclusive elite bargain" at the national level. These explanations seem plausible yet underdetermining, given that similar factors have existed elsewhere without producing the same effects.
So far, the structure and character of state institutions --including the statist character of Tanzania 
